While the military intervention of Libya is both important and controversial, I am convinced that the importance and the controversy will be decided less by arms, more by speech. Talk, there and now, is decidedly not cheap, and this applies both to Libya and to the region. I have theoretical preferences that lead me to such an assertion. I admit. I am guided by a book by Jonathan Schell on this issue in general. But I think the specific evidence in Libya and among its neighbors is overwhelming.
The battles in Libya will yield one of three possible military outcomes. The Libyan resistance, with the aid of outside firepower, will overthrow the regime of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. Alternatively, Qaddafi and company will prevail. Or, there will be a stalemate. Of these three logically possible outcomes, I think it’s pretty clear that a regime victory with a return to the status quo ante is nearly impossible, given the level of internal resistance and external armaments. The best the regime can hope for is a military stalemate, which it would define as a victory. Yet, both in that case and the case of the victory of the resistance, the door will be opened for political change. The form of the change, then, will be decided politically not militarily, by the word, not by the sword.
And the direction of politics will depend on what people are doing in Libya and among its neighbors in the region off the center stage, as I explored last week. The young modern forces that played such an important role in the transformation in Tunisia and Egypt may very well be outmaneuvered by Islamists or by those privileged in the old regime cunningly maintaining their interests. (A New York Times report suggests that this is the unfolding case). These are the three main actors: those who are trying to maintain their privileges, the Islamists of one sort or another, and the young protesters who played a key role in initiating the present course of events. A democratic outcome would accommodate each of these actors. How they are interacting now will shape the way they will interact in the near term, which will determine the course of history. Alarmists interpret the reports of collaboration of the military with the Muslim Brotherhood as a sign of democratic defeat. Yet there is an alternative way to look at it. It is something normal, typical of democratic life. As Matt Yglesias observes a “political coalition between religious conservatives, the military, and economic elites is the bedrock of center-right politics in most democracies.” It is somewhat surprising that it is emerging in Egypt right now, but it is also to be expected.
Roundtable Talks in Warsaw, Poland, from February 6 to April 4, 1989 | Wikimedia Commons
Back in Libya, either a victory by the rebels or a stalemate leads to the necessity of the competing forces to negotiate. As Andrew Arato and Elzbieta Matynia suggested in their posts focused on Egypt, this will require a framework which will promote the possibility of compromise between groups that have fundamentally opposing views and interests, such as the roundtable, an old form developed in the late twentieth century for modern democratic purposes. There is great need for this in Egypt and Libya, and among their neighbors.
The time for mutually respectful talk and the democratic confrontation of competing interests is upon us. The mission creep that I hope for is primarily political not military. There is much about Libya and the region which suggests that a democratic transition is unlikely. Sectarianism, tribalism, authoritarian histories or no history at all are being invoked to explain what a horrible mess we have gotten into. But words can matter and have. Charles Hirschkind, in an important post at The Immanent Frame, shows how “The Road to Tahir,” was constructed with such words over a long time, facilitated by the new social media. There was nothing sudden or magical about Mubarak’s downfall. How powerful such experience will be in paving the road from Tahir is the question. I saw in East and Central Europe how such words overwhelmed authoritarian tendencies in some places, but not in others. I suspect the mixed results of 1989 will be mirrored in the results of 2011. As Arato highlighted in his post, intelligent political action will be decisive.
The future of Libyan society – or, more precisely, the societies found within Libyan borders – is indeed tied to talk, political talk, as opposed to ‘military swords.’
However, I feel that it is grave mistake to think that this political talk will occur within Libya. Their future has been (will be?) decided by political talk between non-Libyan interests.
US intervention within Libya (and I would argue that most nations’ intervention in the Libyan situation) is not linked, IN ANY WAY, with an interest in promoting ‘democracy.’ This is evidenced by the almost universal ignoring (ignorance?) of the severe, violent repression currently occurring in Bahrain (not to mention other nations now and in the recent past) and, on a larger level, the lack of discussion of what ‘democracy in Libya’ will look like.
(I am choosing not to even get into the issue of the fossil fuel interests in Libya that do not exist in any of the other Middle Eastern nations currently in tumult)
I see much of the same rhetoric, that is, political talk, being used here as it was in the run up to the Iraq war. Promoting democracy is a lovely ideal, but almost by definition, democracy is not something that can EVER be abstracted from the on-the-ground realities of a particular social context.
In short, I am dismayed that in my twenties, that is, within less than decade, I will have experienced not one, but two global geopolitical events that have worked to further undermine popular notions of democracy, that is, undermine the actual meaning of the word. My fear is that this will lead to a ‘great forgetting’ of what democracy actually is or what it can achieve (alternatively, my hope is that this will lead to the pursuit of something much better than the inherent subjugation offered representative democracy operating within the context of advanced capitalism).
If we want to discuss ‘political talk,’ we might ask what the ‘democracy’ in ‘spreading democracy’ actually means to people; to Americans, to Libyans, to the world.
I think it is certainly dismaying to have lived most of your life with US militarism as a relative constant. It is not sustainable, and things haven’t always been this way, and don’t need to be this way. And I am also skeptical about the intentions of the US as they embark on yet another military adventure.
However, I think there also needs to be more caution taken when discussing whether the military intervention in Libya is about oil, or whether it can be compared to Iraq, or whether US militarism gives ‘democracy’ a bad name everywhere.
First, the United States currently imports about .63 of a percent of its oil from Libya. Yes, there are US oil companies that operate in Libya, but the amount is negligible when compared to the amount of oil that comes from Iraq. The evidence which would lead one to assume that this is about oil just isn’t there.
Second, the US had a much more “go it alone” attitude when it came to Iraq; this time, calls for the No-Fly zone actually came from the Arab League, and at least two Arab nations, Qatar and the United Arab Emerites, are supplying jet fighters. Juan Cole has actually addressed many of the reasons why the comparisons between Libya and Iraq are tenuous: http://www.juancole.com/2011/03/top-ten-ways-that-libya-2011-is-not-iraq-2003.html
Third, there is a big difference between interventions that are welcomed by the country affected, and where they are both unwelcome and destructive. Remember, what is happening in Libya is part of a larger phenomenon in the Arab world, where, despite the fact the George Bush tarnished the image of democracy in much of the world. The Iraq War has shown clearly shown want most sane people already know intuitively: democracy cannot be imposed from the top down. This is an ideological form of democracy, that is to be considered distinct from a grassroots desire for self-rule, aka ‘democracy.’ I think we should also consider the perspective of those that have a genuine desire for democracy. They now very well what it is. And from their perspective, US intervention may actually be welcomed. Whether the US should actually intervene or not is another matter.
There is a good reason we should worried about US intervention in Libya. It sustains the norm of US militarism. The military industrial complex is horribly corrupt and out of control. Since 1998, the US military budget has doubled. However, there is another troubling twist to all this. The number of jobs that are tied to the US military. As reported in the Christian Science Monitor: Over 1,400,000 Americans are now on active duty; another 833,000 are in the reserves, many full time. Another 1,600,000 Americans work in companies that supply the military with everything from weapons to utensils… If we didn’t have this giant military jobs program, the U.S. unemployment rate would be over 11.5 percent today instead of 9.5 percent.”
If we view the US military also as a job program, I think we can understand why every time budget cuts to the military is suggested, you hear an outcry from some Congressman or Senator, because jobs in their district or state are threatened. The military industrial complex has become part of the fabric of the US economy. The US military needs to be seriously downsized, but at the same time, there needs to be a way to ensure that those whose jobs are affected have some other options. As it is now, their options are few.
I think humanitarian intervention is at times justified. Yet there is always the danger though that greed and corruption can play a role and taint its promise. I believe it is realistic to have such concerns, and of course, argue whether or not humanitarian intervention is at any time justified, and question the intentions of the actors involved. In spite of all this, I empathize with the rebels in Libya, and want them to succeed. Without intervention, they would most likely have been crushed. I however wish that the Arab nations that wanted a No-Fly zone in the first place were talking a bigger role, and in fact, the lead role. Indeed, one of the problems that US militarism creates is the dependency of those countries who rely on the US defense umbrella. Again, things weren’t always this way and shouldn’t be this way.
So in conclusion, I also think skepticism of all military intervention is justified and necessary. But in doing so, I think the specifics of the case should be addressed before we rush to judgement. As any reader who has taken the time to read my admittedly rambling comment might guess, I am ambivalent about the role of the US in Libya. There needs to be more assurances that this role doesn’t expand, and I would not in any circumstances support an escalation of that role.