Now that the Obama administration has concluded that the red line has been crossed, that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons against its own people, there will be more military aid for the rebels from the U.S. and its allies. Although this will certainly affect the course of the war (though the rebels and their strong supporters, such as John McCain, will demand more), equally certain is that this aid will not on its own positively affect the prospects for a just peace, with an improved situation for the Syrian people in their diversity.

The dark situation that Hakan Topal described in his last post on Syria (and Turkey and its neo-Ottoman foreign policy) stands: profoundly undemocratic and illiberal, brutal and barbarian actions are on both sides of the Syrian military conflict. The victory of one side or the other is likely to yield very unpleasant outcomes, as each side reveals itself with more and more horrific means of fighting, and more and more sectarian commitments.

The story of the Syrian opposition is tragic. A very hopeful peaceful protest was heartlessly repressed. The bravery of peaceful protestors in the face of military force, including bombings, was remarkable. I watched the persistence of the protests in the face of brutal force with wonder and deep admiration. Violent resistance was an understandable last resort.

But as resistance fighters have replaced peaceful protesters, and as the war has escalated, with the fortunes of each side rising and falling, the nature of the war seems to have fundamentally undermined the ideals of the protest. Islamist true belief seems to have overwhelmed democratic and pluralistic commitment. Sectarian interest, defense and retribution seem to animate the resistance’s actions, no less than the actions of the government forces and the forces of Hezbollah.

I want to believe that out of this mess something less than horrific may result. But by reading the headlines and the debates here in the U.S., I see little that is promising. I am not an expert on Syria or the region, but as I read what the experts have to say, I despair. They don’t point to a way out. Yet without knowing exactly how it would work, I do see some basis of hope in action off the central political and military stage, not captured in headlines or in expert analysis.

Well before the Arab Spring, in May 2010, I read an interesting article in The New York Times about a literary salon in Syria. It reminded me of the kind of alternative cultural activity I first worked on during the communist years in Poland. The significance of the Polish and the Syrian activities was clear to me: the existence of a space apart from the logic of the existing order, where people could speak and act freely changed the nature of the repressive order. This suggests the possibility of a different order, with a changed relationship between power and culture, in my terms “reinventing political culture,” immediately in a small way, and, perhaps, in a big way in the long term. This happened in Poland. I hope it can also happen in Syria. I see some positive signs.

A couple of weeks ago the Polish translator of Reinventing Political Culture, Agata Lisiak, sent me a note about a new Syrian blog, Syria Untold. She knows my perspective as well as I do and she recognized how important this blog could be. It’s an instance of the politics of small things under extreme circumstances, in wartime conditions. It’s an instance of a small group of people working creatively to reinvent political culture. I think it provides a glimpse of a broad range of activities that provides an alternative to despair. It tells the story of an emergent alternative to tragedy in Syria.

The blog is only a couple of months old, but it is already very impressive. Its self-description:

“Syria Untold is an independent digital media project exploring the storytelling of the Syrian struggle and the diverse forms of resistance. We are a team of Syrian writers, journalists, programmers and designers living in the country and abroad trying to highlight the narrative of the Syrian revolution, which Syrian men and women are writing day by day. Through grassroots campaigns, emerging forms of self-management and self-government and endless manifestations of citizen creativity, a new outspoken Syria has emerged, after decades of repression and paralysis. With mainstream media focusing increasingly on geostrategic and military aspects and less on internal dynamics developing on the ground, we believe there are many aspects of the Syrian struggle that remain uncovered, many stories that we would not like to see forgotten. Welcome to the stories of daily resistance and creativity. Welcome to Syria Untold.”

Clearly this is an example of what I call “the politics of small things,” telling the story of other practices of the politics of small things around Syria.

Syria Untold tells the history of the resistance starting before the Arab Spring. It gives day to day descriptions of non-violent opposition around the country. Playful protests are reported, e.g. even Syrian snowmen want freedom. Other “untold stories” include reports on the work of Syrian artists commenting on the course of the Syrian transformation, a beautiful animated cartoon of a tulip overthrowing a tank by the famous artist, Ali Farzat, the work of “The Rebel Painter of Horan,” and the musicians in the city of Duma using the instruments of war to make music.

The emerging alternative media landscape is sketched. The story of the “creative state building” in the city of Raqqa within the chaos of war is told. The deep significance of demonstrations in the small town Bustan al-Qasr (The Palace Orchard) which seek to maintain the ideals of peaceful resistance and self governance after the withdrawal of the Syrian army is revealed:

“As one of the signs from their countless demonstrations highlights, the people of Bustan al-Qasr inisist that ‘in the Syria of the future there will be no revenge but justice, and everyone without distinction will be held accountable for their actions.’”

There is also a report on an independent Internet Radio station reinforcing this theme. The radio declares:

“We believe that our problem is that we don’t listen to each other. Our message isn’t aimed at any one group over others, rather we try to reach every Syrian heart and especially those of the so called ‘silent majority.’”

Syria Untold is published both in Arabic and English. I don’t know for sure, but I imagine that the Arabic version is even more impressive, as the stories of an alternative to the tragedy is enacted and reported. I don’t know how consequential beyond its immediate creators and audience it will be. But I do know that Syria is different because such a project exists. And I do see an alternative to a tragic end is visible in its actions: grounds for hope.

Hakan Topal wrote this piece before the recent protests and repression in Turkey. It provides a perspective for understanding those events, as it highlights the tragedy of Syria and how Turkish policy is implicated. -Jeff

At the end of May, the Syrian civil war consumed more than 94,000 civilians and destroyed the country’s civic and cultural heritage. In addition, the civil war crystallized regional fault lines along the sectarian lines; on the one side Sunni Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, on the other side Shiite Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah (Lebanon) represent ever-increasing nationalistic conflicts.

While Assad’s army commits war crimes, kills thousands of civilians, and unleashes its terror on its population, factions within the Free Syrian Army utilize comparable tactics to bring Assad’s supporters to submission. This is a war with plenty of religious morality but without ethics. In a recent video circulated on YouTube, a Free Syrian Army guerilla cuts the chest of a dead Syrian soldier and eats it in front of the camera. How can we make sense of this absolute brutality?

Islamists who have no interest in democratic transformation hijacked the Syrian revolution. Any salient voices for the possibility of a diplomatic solution are silenced, effectively forcing the country into a never-ending sectarian war. Can the total destruction of the social and cultural infrastructure be for the sake any political agenda or social imagination? What will happen when the regime falls? Is there a future for Syrians?

And tragically, the civil war cannot be simply contained within Syria. It is quickly expanding beyond its borders, scratching local religious, sectarian and political sensitivities, especially in Turkey and Lebanon. A recent bombing in Reyhanli—a small town at the Turkish-Syrian border with largely Arab Alevi minority population—killed 54 people and subsequently, the Turkish government quickly covered up the incident and accused a left wing fraction having close ties with Assad regime of mounting the attacks. It was a premature and doubtful conclusion. Leftist guerillas have no history of attacking civilian targets in city centers. A couple of weeks after the attacks, the Turkish hacker group Redhack uncovered some early intelligence reports that identified the possible attackers, linking them to the Al Nusra Front—an Al Qaida association operating freely in Syria—supported from Turkish bases. The government was silent about these intelligence documents.

Criminal investigation is continuing. However, no matter who executed the Reyhanli terror attacks, be it Assad sympathizers in Turkey, the Assad regime, or the Al Nusra Front, the objective is to pull Turkey into the circle of war by provoking local sectarian divisions. In fact, Turkey’s ethnic, cultural and political fabric is extremely sensitive to Syrian civil war. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan lacks any governmental responsibility or wisdom; instead of carefully navigating the Syrian crisis, he gambles with the Islamists on the faith of Assad’s regime and pushes Turkey to its very limits both financially and culturally. After the Reyhanli attacks, the Turkish public became aware of the fact that Turkish foreign policy lacks any salient political calculation. There is no exit strategy. At this moment, Turkish minorities are on high alert, feeling the increasing religious and nationalistic oppression and day-to-day discrimination. Today, in a ground-breaking ceremony, Erdogan named the third Bosporus bridge as Yavuz Sultan Selim, the Ottoman king who persecuted Anatolian Alevis in the end of 15^th and beginning of the 16^th centuries.

Since the Islamists took control of the government over a decade ago, neo-Ottomanist imperialist ambitions have fueled Turkish foreign policy. Erdogan and his team imagined a Middle East where Turkey plays a big brother role, leading regional economic transformation into a big functioning market. The transformation in the region after the second Iraq war was considered a historic opportunity for Turkish neoliberal-Islamists. Total disbelief of western democratic models wrapped-up with Arab Occidentalism created a fertile ground for Turkey’s increasingly colonialist hunger, that accesses huge young Arab markets, reaching oil fields and extending political influence. These imperial ambitions at first presented themselves via so-called “soft power” moves; Erdogan established very close connections with the regions’ notorious dictators and leaders. For instance, he frequently visited Assad and his family, and called him a close friend. He had no trouble receiving the Al-Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights in Libya for his “distinguished service to humanity”—no, this is not a joke. He supported Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, a war criminal whose supporters committed genocide in Darfur.

When it comes to Arab Springs, Erdogan and his team were caught unprepared. He scrambled his policies to adjust to the reality on the ground. These days, when it comes to Syria, Erdogan speaks about democracy and human rights, he (rightly so) asks Assad to step down and stop committing war crimes. However, how can we trust an Islamist who has been a keen supporter of war criminals?

A year ago, with direct knowledge of the government, Turkish military planes bombed and killed 34 Kurdish (Turkish) citizens from Roboski village, who were simply smuggling gas and cigarettes. It has been over 500 days since the incident and the Turkish government blocked any attempts for a criminal investigation. Currently, there are thousands of students, academics and journalists in Turkish prisons. In fact, Turkey has one of the worst human rights records within the developed world. Every time the opposition presses Erdogan’s government for justice, he effectively changes the public agenda by bringing forward issues such abortion or alcohol ban to further divide society, playing to his Islamist base. With his notorious temper, street charisma and machismo, he may be a popular figure on Arab street, but with his divisive right-wing agenda, he is far from a democratic leader who can promote peace or democracy in the region. While the Arab youth thinks highly of him, they forgot the fact that what they need is not another powerful patrimonial figure to replace their unfortunate dictators. When democracy is served only as an option for minorities, it presents itself as the dictatorship of the majority. This is now playing out in the streets of Turkey, which I will explore in my next post.

Sadly, if we can identify a common tread among societies in the Middle East, it’s the chronic hypocrisy inflicted by all governments, public recklessness and immunity. It is not Islam per se, but years of Middle Eastern-style patrimonial government that paralyzed societies. Not to mention that internal and foreign policy lacks any long-term strategic thinking. The possibility of dialogue and careful diplomacy is replaced with bullying; politics is understood as a pure power game where those in power have the right to absolute appropriation of commons, suffocating minorities and opposition.

Syria has become a sad corner of the world where there are no good fronts any more. Evil has consumed the territory. Cities are in ruin. Turkish support for Islamists in Syria created more bloodshed rather than providing a swift solution. While Turkey also pays a price for the long lasting civil war in Syria, Turkish foreign policy is sidelined in any decision-making process. The U.S. and EU do not want to step into to the hell— fearing that a western intervention would have larger consequences. In the mean time, as the war is escalating, it is pulling Turkey and Lebanon, two of neighboring countries, into regional abyss. Erdogan’s government will be remembered as one of the losers.

The really sad thing about Syria, whoever wins this war, is that they won’t have a country to celebrate.

The Israeli summer: Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in one demonstration after another. Hundreds erected tents in the middle of cities and other public places and lived in them. Protests were not about war and peace, but social concerns, a strong, angry and frustrated cry against the high cost of living and the quality of life. The demonstrators were particularly concerned about the price of housing (both for purchase and rent), low salaries, and the retreat of Israel from its previous social welfare commitments and the transformation of the state into what has become known as a “swine capitalism.” In July and August of this year, the unprecedented happened. Irit Dekel has already reported and appraised at Deliberately Considered earlier developments. Here, I consider a hopeful sign, and suggest how the concerns of the protestors might be addressed, even though I think this is unlikely, given the nature of the present government of the country.

A Hopeful Sign

As the massive civil protests were taking place, supporters were concerned that the sharp edge of this genuine social and political protest may be neutralized if a military threat suddenly erupts. Possible scenarios included President Assad of Syria or Hezbollah in Lebanon igniting Israel’s northern border in order to deflect international attention from Assad’s brutal suppression of the revolt against him. While this did not happen, in mid August, Israel’s southern border was ignited as Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza exchanged fire. This heightened military tension immediately set the agenda for the news. Coverage of the protest by the media all but disappeared. Yet, the protest did not abate.

Given this persistence, the political authorities are under great pressure to respond. Yet, Netanyahu and his government, at best, will try to placate the protestors, making minor changes, merely alleviating some of the despair, stress and misery that fueled the protests.  A significant response to the Israeli summer would require changed national priorities. Although I don’t think there is a political will for this by the ruling parties, important changes are possible, practical policy changes that could free resources, making major social change possible.

Possible Practical Remedies

A first candidate is the national settlement project in the occupied territories. Since 1967, the state has invested in building settlements, constructing roads, tax breaks for the settlers, and allocating military resources to defend the settlements, and probably some more expenses I am unaware of. In fact, the cost of the settlement project is hidden in so many items in the national budget that some researchers refer to this cost as one of the top secrets of the country. Many experts have pointed out that the “defense value” of these territories has become questionable, as was revealed during the second Lebanon War. Moreover, Israel’s public commitment to compromise with the Palestinians on the West Bank requires a serious decrease of the investments in the settlements.

Another expense that can be cut significantly is the financial support to religious institutions. Interestingly, Israel has a social welfare policy for some groups of its population. The religious agendas of many parties in past Israeli coalition governments managed to prioritize the allocation of resources to institutions such as Yeshivot, building Mikves (purification baths), as well as support a very large number of Haredi, ultra orthodox, males to devote their entire life to study sacred scriptures. The side effects of this policy are that large numbers of Haredi males are excluded from the job market, and that the relatively little amount of support has forced many traditionally large Haredi families into poverty. While Yeshivot and the study of the scriptures are important and fascinating parts of Jewish cultural tradition, the state can no longer completely subsidize this large a population. One way to save money is to change to a merit based system and only grant state benefits to the best scholars. A smaller number of scholars in Yeshivot could even benefit from the newly freed resources, as some of the money could be dedicated to a larger stipend to lift them out of poverty.

A third location to free up resources is the military budget. To give just one glaring, illustrative area: the retirement age of professional soldiers in the Israeli Defense Forces which was 45, has increased for some to 50. But why not increase it to 65? As an illustration, some of the best generals and salient military men during WWII were not teenagers. In 1943, at the height of the war, George Patton was 58, Bernard Montgomery 56 and Douglas MacArthur 63. They endured much harsher field conditions than today’s generals. General Norman Schwarzkopf, the military man behind the 1990-1 operation Desert Shield, was 56 years old at that time. Currently, Israel maintains two armies. One is the regular army, the other is an army of retired military personnel, of whom many are relatively young, have no desire to sit on the porch and bathe in the sun, and are actively engaged second careers. The military thus loses able soldiers with much valued accumulated experience while the civilian job market is dealing with an army of eager competitors for a variety of jobs that should indeed be filled by civilians. It has actually led to a situation where many civilian positions have been filled by ‘military’ people whose formative years and way of thinking were shaped and imprinted by military training that helped to shape their cognitive maps, their social networks, and their ways of conceptualizing issues. Another military saving lies in reducing the length of the compulsory service (three years for males now).

Political Implications and Prospects

Once resources are freed, money can be allocated to items that the protesters have asked for. First, resources need to be directed towards Israel’s Arab population, which constitutes about 20% of the Israeli population. Generally, the Arabs are being discriminated against and alienated in ways that are unbecoming for a democratic regime. The democratic legitimacy of Israel requires this reform.

And to further address the major norm of the protests, to truly accomplish a more equal distribution of resources, a reduction in the cost of living and more welfare, another significant change in the political structure is required. Israel, generally, has been ruled by coalition governments. These have been deeply flawed. They have been, as many Israelis have come to call them “Goalitzia.” This is a combination of two words in Hebrew: “Goal Nefesh” meaning “disgusting” and “Coalitzia” meaning “coalition.” This diabolical form of government is incapable of effective rule. Many decisions of Israeli governments are never carried out, nor does anybody feel responsible for the decisions that are made. This form of government simply means that any politician, or group of politicians, can promise voters the moon, sky and maybe the whole galaxy. but once they form a coalition with others, politicians, does not keep their election promises. They have the ultimate excuse for why not – the coalitional government. Each coalition party can blame one or more of its partners for not delivering on the promises it has made, freeing the party leaders from any responsibility. On top of this, this type of government has an almost built-in tendency to give small parties the power and resources way above and beyond their size, fundamentally distorting the will of the vast majority. A more democratic form of government would go along way in answering the democratic demands of the summer.

Now, the probability that any of the above listed suggestions will be applied is close to zero. Netanyahu appointed a committee of experts in response to the demonstrations. Its mandate is limited (e.g., to tax reforms) and it probably cannot, and perhaps should not, make recommendations for such significant social and political changes as I am proposing here. This should be done politically, not bureaucratically. For major political changes, one does not need a committee of experts. One needs politicians with a positive, democratic vision and a passionate drive to accomplish such a vision. Of course, a political solution of the conflict with the Palestinians and other Arab countries would not just release resources for civilian expenses, but, more generally, enable Israel to orient itself toward a more civil, liberal democratic society.

Given present political realities a resolution of the conflict, along with the practical reforms I have examined here, is difficult to imagine – even for this science fiction fan.