The economic and political crisis in Greece has escalated, with the rise of the neo Nazi Golden Dawn party and the development of a political movement seeking alternatives to austerity on the radical left, SYRIZA. In the following interview excerpt conducted by Doug Enna Greene of the Boston Occupier, Lalaki offers her understanding of the current situation. -Jeff

DEG: Why do you think Golden Dawn has gained so much support? What measures do you think are necessary to stop them?

DL: Historically when democracies fail, which is followed by disenchantment, political cynicism and disillusionment, a vacuum in created that is often filled by extremist ideologies like that offered by groups such as the Golden Dawn, the Neo-Nazi party that is now member of the Greek Parliament. The GD proclaims an anti-systemic position, provided that they have never been part of what they condemn as the corrupt political system and they pose as defenders of principles such as that of national sovereignty, which has come under assault by the governing bodies of the EU. Suffice it to say that they have no alternative program in place other than expelling all immigrants from the country, the people that they systematically target and accuse for the rising unemployment in Greece while they often unleash assault squads in the streets of Athens, as well as other cities, in order to attack and terrorize individuals or whole immigrant communities.

One cannot hope for any measures to be taken by the Greek government or the police, which most often directly collaborates with the GD. The Nazification of the police at this stage is notorious. Racism is rampant, especially among its lower ranks. We have many examples of cases when they strongly discourage people who have been subjected to attacks from bringing charges against their perpetrators. During antifascist protests, they openly protect the DG and they arrest and prosecute the protesters. In October, fifteen anti-fascist protesters were arrested in Athens during a clash with GD supporters. Following their arrest, they were tortured at the Attica General Police Directorate (GEDA). The incident was extensively documented and the news reached through Guardian, which published an article on the subject on October 9, and other media an international audience.

Any resistance against GD has to come directly from the people. Direct mobilization on community level has in many cases obstructed their plans to open offices in various locations or to further terrorize local communities. Greek workers’ organizations increasingly work in collaboration with immigrant groups publicly protesting the presence of GD in neighborhoods and exposing them for their crimes. In the past couple of years, at least 800 cases of attacks by GD have been documented. However, nobody has been prosecuted or brought to justice. The political system and the governing parties are directly responsible for the rise of the GD. It is our responsibility, therefore, not to tolerate GD’s attempts to make racism, religious fundamentalism, and homophobia into a rule of life

DEG: What are your impressions of SYRIZA? Where is it likely to go in the next elections? What obstacles do you believe a potential SYRIZA government would face?

DL: The Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA, has risen out of the economic crisis, the disintegration of the old political system and new forms of popular organization. In the most recent elections in June 2012 SYRIZA polled just under 27%, and became the main opposition party facing a governing collation of ND, which had received merely 2.8% more, Pasok and the Democratic Left. Within the period of a month and despite the heinous propaganda which was unleashed by the mainstream media in Greece and abroad, SYRIZA had managed to increase its share of votes more than 10 points. In the May elections of the same year, it had polled over 16%, while in the previous elections of 2009 it had received only 4.6% of the vote. There is a direct co-relation therefore between the unraveling of the economic, social and political crisis in Greece and the rise of SYRIZA.

I would characterize SYRIZA as a “party in progress.” It is a coalition party that plays host to various left-wing organizations, ranging from revolutionary socialist to the radical reform-oriented and to many unaffiliated individuals still in need of a more clear agenda and political program. While moving towards becoming a more unified political group, SYRIZA held its first national conference at the end of November 2012. The fact that two different streams of views emerged from the conference, the one grouped under the so-called “United Platform” and the other the “Left Platform” is rather telling. SYRIZA does not adhere to traditional party politics, at least not yet. The draft proposals that were voted, with the “United Platform” having received the majority of the vote, are rather abstract, however, some very important points of difference were put in place.

The following constitute only the main points of contention between the two streams of thought. The “United Platform” wishes to break with the Europe of neoliberalism and authoritarianism, while it sees the fate of Greece as concomitant with the fate of Europe, and it calls for a renegotiation of the debt at a European level with the objective to discard a great part of it as illegal. The “United Platform’s” proposal further promises to cancel the memorandum, place the banks under public control, reinforce the welfare state and gradually place the strategic sectors of the economy under public control. It also suggests that its goal is to form a government with the Left at its center, leaving this way the window open to a possible collaborating with the conservative political forces.

The “Left Platform,” on the other side, adopts a more critical view toward the European Union, and while it does not advocate a direct confrontation with a return to the national currency of drachma, it maintains that it is imperative for SYRIZA to develop a so-called Plan B and be prepared for a possible exit from the EU. The cancellation of the debt, the immediate stop of payments toward the debt and the establishment of a united left front in close collaboration with KKE and Antarsya, the other left parties, trade unions and community-based movements, a front which will lead to a left government are central points for the “Left Platform.”

SYRIZA has an appointment with the history of the Left in Europe. It has an opportunity to become the leader of the various movements and radical political formations currently taking place in the whole continent by identifying with the Europe of radicalism, as the “United Platform’s” proposal suggested. SYRIZA needs to build direct relations with these movements and trade unions that already put up a fight against the austerity and social degradation imposed by the governing bodies of Europe, instead of cozying up with those directly responsible for the economic crisis. It is argued that SYRIZA is increasingly succumbing to pressures to adjust its rhetoric to a more “realistic” direction, because otherwise the forces directly related to the interests of capital will stand on SYRIZA’s way to electoral victory. However, this is precisely the fight that SYRIZA is called to give before or after an electoral victory. If the most recent rhetoric of “realpolitik” is merely a strategic move then I believe it is a wrong one because as the cases of Bolivia, Equador, Venezuela and Argentina suggest, the implementation of more radical policies will not go unchallenged, to say the least, after SYRIZA receives a popular mandate to govern.

The kind of pressures that a SYRIZA government will face is directly related to the kind of party SYRIZA will end up being. If SYRIZA develops a policy of collaboration with the governing European elites, which are deeply invested in neoliberalism and financial capitalism, then SYRIZA will be subjected to great pressures from the bottom and its electoral victory will only be short lived.

DEG: Greece has seen many general strikes in the past several years, yet they have not been able to stop austerity. Do you think that other measures aside from general strikes are needed?

DL: General strikes and popular mobilizations have destabilized and eventually brought down two different governments since 2009. By November 14, 2012, when a general strike was called across Europe, Greece would go to a national stoppage for the 21^st time in the last two years. In general, workers and trade unions are caught up in a fragmented labor market characterized by what is called “flexible” employment conditions and are faced with an unequal struggle against employers who have been greatly invigorated by recent legislation. It is clear from cases like that of the nine-month general strike of the steel workers of Hellenic Halyvourgia plant that Greek as well as European capitalists will make no concessions and that unless a continuous general strike is called by the largest and most powerful unions of the country little progress can be made toward stopping the government’s austerity polities. Yet, other forms of resistance greatly hamper the government’s austerity plans.

Financial resistance has been elevated almost into supreme civil duty. Small business owners collectively resist paying the new increased taxes and fees. Some city councils have encouraged their citizens not to pay the taxes imposed by the government through the electricity bill, always under the threat of electricity cuts, while providing the necessary legal coverage. As a result thousands of households resist these practices of rampant taxations imposed on the lower and middle strata of the Greek society. Movements such as the “Can’t Pay, Won’t Pay” mobilize precisely around these kinds of efforts. Also, in many parts of the country, people try to circumvent the austerity by adopting a barter system. These may be tactics of survival under the extreme conditions of the economic crisis, but they also constitute revolutionary practices which challenge not merely the government’s policies but the system of capitalism at its roots.

DEG: What future austerity measures are expected in Greece either from the government and/or the Troika? How do you expect this to affect your organizing in New York?

DL: Greece is undergoing the fifth year of recession. The most recent austerity measures, worth of 13.5 billion euros over the next two years, were voted just this past November. The new bill raises the retirement age from 65 to 67 and cuts pensions on average between 5% and 15%. Salaries in the public sector will be reduced by about a third, minimum wages will be further slashed to below €400 net. Maximum number of workday per week will be increased to six days, and work schedules will be increasingly “flexible.” Collective bargaining agreements will not be legally enforceable. Along with a series of other labor changes, working classes’ status and rights basically regress to what they used to be back in the Interwar period.

In Greece strong resistance is already building against the implementation of these new austerity measures. Increasingly massive protests take place in Europe almost on a regular basis. In NYC we will also continue organizing and mobilizing against the economic and social degradation that is brought upon our societies. This is clearly a class struggle and it has to be fought as such!

Click here for the full interview.

The economic crisis in Greece is heading towards yet another showdown today. The Greek electorate threatens to strike a serious blow against neoliberalism and its European offshoot. At the same time, these elections promise to unravel the Greek state’s monopoly on the structures of violence and fear.

Sociologist Charles Tilly drew a compelling analogy between the state as the place of organized means of violence, and racketeering. He defined the racketeer “as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction,” in order to gain control and consolidate power. In this regard, a state and its government differ little from racketeering, to the extent that the threats against which they protect their citizens are imaginary or are consequences of their own activities.

Considering the pain, the humiliation, and the social degradation that the economic and political policies of the Greek government have inflicted upon the country the past four years, Tilly’s analogy may offer us a useful tool to both describe and evaluate the current crisis and the regime of fear that the state has unleashed on the Greek public.

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which is now a democratic socialist party in name only, governed Greece for almost 30 years, moving steadily from Keynesian economic policies in the 1980s to rampant neoliberalism in the 1990s. New Democracy (ND), which had dominated the political scene until PASOK’s first electoral victory in 1981 and alternated in power with it ever since, professed its ideology to be “radical liberalism.” Today, after three decades of cronyism, unbridled corruption and economic scandals, the ideological convergence of the two parties is complete.

Despite its initial apprehension towards the European Union, membership in the organzation enabled PASOK to implement its policies and boost the Greek economy. With the help of substantial financial inflows from the European Economic Community, PASOK was able to redistribute wealth.

Despite the growing government deficits, the emphasis remained on sustaining employment and modernizing the welfare system. In the meantime, democratic socialism – enveloped in patronage and nepotism – evolved into a process for democratizing corruption. Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos’s infamously vulgar statement in 2010 – “We [the government and citizens] fooled away the money together” – alluded to government-bred tactics which for years secured positions for its electorate in an ever-expanding bureaucratic machine.

Under the weight of economic scandals, pressure from PASOK’s “modernizing wing”, and the Maastricht Treaty’s aim to bring about monetary convergence by 1998, the Greek government launched an extensive program liberalizing the financial and banking sector, slashing government subsidies and pensions, deregulating the labor market and privatizing more than 100 companies from 1994 to 1999.

Some of the most prominent of these businesses included: AGET-Hercules, the cement company that literally built Greece after World War II, the Hellenic shipyards, Piraiki-Patraiki, a textile industry that in the 1980s was the second-largest employer after the Greek public sector, and ETVA, the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank. New Democracy, which governed briefly between 1990 and 1993, effectively championed the same policies.

The implementation of neoliberal policies, increasingly executed by an emerging new breed of technocrat politicians, was often met with strong resistance by labor unions and powerful interest groups which for years had enjoyed the state’s protection. Economic scandals underscored the “restructuring” process. When AGET-Hercules was sold for a fraction of its value to a nearly bankrupt Italian industrial group, extreme violence erupted. The assassination of Michael Vranopoulos, a former chief of State Bank who had handled the sale, by the terrorist group November 17, highlighted the public’s discontent.

The largely tolerant attitudes of the Greek public towards November 17, which operated from 1975 until 2002 with an anti-American, anti-capitalist agenda – it was viewed almost as a modern Robin Hood – reflected Greeks’ increasing frustration with the political establishment. Most importantly, this predisposition reflected people’s inability to effectively react.

The Greek state has always had a tight grip on society, and Greek society has always had a love-hate relationship with the state. Strongly dependent on the state for employment in an ever-expanding public sector, which was tied up with unions that over the years had come under the control of the government, the Greek public often vented its dissatisfaction with riots, protests and strikes, largely orchestrated by the parties of the Left. But it was unable to fundamentally challenge a system that was excluding them from decision-making processes.

But Greece’s booming economy at the time – fuelled by the adoption of the euro, easy credit conditions, and substantial transfers from the EU – painted the picture of a seemingly prosperous society. In reality, a small elite was reaping vast profits from the government’s neoliberal policies, while the lower and middle classes paid the hefty price, as the massive Greek stock exchange scandal of 1999-2000 highlights.

A central role of the state is that of offering protection to its citizens. “Protection,” however, as Tilly suggests, echoes two contrasting tones: a comforting and an ominous one. It calls forth images of shelter against danger provided by a powerful friend, an insurance policy or a sturdy roof. It also evokes, however, the racket in which a local strong man, for instance, forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage – damage he himself threatens to deliver – or a neighborhood mobster who claims to be a brothel’s best guarantee of operation free of police interference.

The death spiral that the Greek economy entered in 2008 called for all the government protection that the public could use. Instead, the government signed up for the financial bailout packages imposed by the so-called “troika,” the European Committee, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The packages included a series of unprecedented austerity measures which brought the lower and middle classes to their knees, while leaving intact the privileges of the financial elites and their political aides.

As a result of the tremendous economic pressure, the government had started losing its tight grip on Greek society as far back as 2008. Massive protests triggered by the police killing of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a 15-year-old student, expressed young people’s increasing frustration with the prospect of a bleak future.

By the spring of 2011, a whole new movement had been galvanised. The “Indignant Citizens Movement,” an offshoot of the Spanish Indignados, occupied central Athens’ Syntagma Square for four months. Organized collectively and independent from any party or trade union affiliation, the movement was another indication that the government was governing without the consent of the people. Civil disobedience and organizations dedicated to collective action sprung up to deal with the pauperization unleashed by austerity.

The backlash has been a campaign of fear, which on occasion escalates into outright terror. Instilling fear in its clientele is the primary mechanism employed by any racketeer. The violent suppression of mass protests, the detention of undocumented immigrants, and the arrest and public display on the Greek police’s website of 12 prostitutes infected with HIV have had a single goal: to terrorize the Greek public and ultimately offer “protection” against the dissidents, anarchists, protesters, and immigrants. The rise of Golden Dawn, the neo-Nazi party, which won about seven per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections in May, was the direct result of these practices.

Fear is the sovereign’s predicament, as 17th-century political philosopher Hobbes has shown – not a natural emotion, but one cultivated through a system of moral education conducted by state institutions and their affiliates, most prominently, in our days, by the media. When these institutions lose legitimacy, their tactics may ultimately backfire, as the May elections showed. The rise of Syriza, a coalition of anti-austerity leftist parties ahead of today’s elections has triggered a new round of propaganda alluding to a communist takeover, loss of private property, alienation from the markets and the international community, and most importantly, to a financial Armageddon.

In defiance of this fear, an awakening of political consciousness is taking place in Greece’s squares, streets, and online social networks, not merely condemning the policies of austerity and social degradation but collectively working towards new types of political resistance. It is becoming clear that only the people of Greece can deliver and ultimately save themselves from the racketeering, criminal practices of their “protectors”.

This article was first published by Al Jazeera English network on June 15, 2012.

I write here about the election in France, but first must note that the most important European news this week very well may come from Greece. The legislative elections there clearly show the disastrous political consequences of hyper-austerity. They demonstrate that the European handling of the crisis has not only brought no remedy. It has aggravated the problem. The results of the Greek elections provide the context for understanding politics in Europe, including France.

In France, François Hollande’s victory did not come as a surprise, but the nature of the victory indicates fundamental changes in the political landscape. The unexpected element was the relatively low margin of victory. He received only 51.6% of the votes after having led constantly in the polls, approaching 60% at times. Sarkozy’s far-right accented campaign shocked the so-called “Republican right,” leading the center right leader François Bayrou to vote for Holland in the second round of the election. It did, though significantly, enable Sarkozy to win substantial  support from those who voted for the far-rightist Marine Le Pen in the first round. This needs deliberate consideration.

Sarkozy’s hyper-nationalist, openly anti-European and strongly anti-Islam stance during the last days of the campaign ominously has reunited the right on an ideological basis. Of course, Sarkozy’s neo-nationalist turn was partly tactical, but now there is a real possibility of a dialogue between the far-rightist National Front and the “Republican” right (the President’s party UMP). The so-called “droite populaire,” a part of the UMP that claims 70 députés in the Assemblée nationale, is not against talking to Le Pen. The new ideological horizon for the French right is undoubtedly one of the most important consequences of the presidential election. Sarkozy has played the nationalist and anti-Islam card with an unexpected dedication, particularly if one recalls his attitude during the first years of his presidency, when he practiced the “ouverture” to the left and to ethnic minorities, appointing the French-Senegalese Rama Yade and the French-North Africans, Rachida Dati and Fadela Amara, to ministerial  positions. His late commitment to the old Nation was also contradictory with his previous “Merkozy” attitude, that led him to agree with the Kanzlerin in all circumstances. The reconstruction of the French right is underway, as are important changes on the left.

The Socialist Hollande shifted his trajectory during the campaign also, with interesting implications. Having started with a clear support of a form of leftist austerity and a strong commitment to reduce the French debt, he has turned to a more critical position vis-à-vis the German conventional wisdom, and has come up with new fiscal measures, such as the 75% tax on over one million euros income. This was done partly under the pressure of the rise of a new radical left led by the former member of the Socialist Party Jean-Luc Mélenchon and leader of the Front de Gauche, but not only. The Socialists have changed because the austerity packages clearly have not worked, in Greece, Spain or Portugal. While Hollande remains aware of the dangers of economic leftism that led Mitterrand to turn to austerity in 1983 after two year of big spending policy, he is now convinced that he will not succeed with the center-right policy that was advocated from within the Parti Socialiste by Dominique Strauss-Kahn. In this election, the Socialists have regained, partly with the support of the Front de Gauche, but not only, the majority of the clerical workers (58%) and the working class (68%) voted socialist, proving that the popular classes’ turn toward the nationalist and xenophobe National Front is far from an accomplished fact, but is in part the illusion, largely spread by the moderate left think tanks, particularly Terra Nova, according to which the Socialists should focus on middle classes only.

Hollande started his campaign with the claim for a “normal presidency.” Against Sarkozy’s bling-bling presidency, but also against Strauss-Kahn jet setter left. He was mocked for that: how could an average guy do an extraordinary job? But the “président normal” attitude proved to be his best asset in a time of political disenchantment. The French people don’t expect that much from him. It was clear with the celebration of his victory last Sunday night in the Place de la Bastille, which I observed on the scene. Although it might have looked as a replay of Mitterrand’s fête on May 10th 1981, there was no utopian mood displayed and no claim to “changer la vie.” Rather, there was a minimal modest claim: if life can’t be changed radically, it can be kept secure to some extent. Hollande will be a normal president for abnormal times.

Hollande, the unpretentious and “provincial” politician, could reveal himself to be a European Roosevelt, reinstalling the notion of public interest in the political landscape and offering a new deal to the European Union. But to do this, he must find strong allies against the “there is no alternative” mode of thinking. No one would have bet a single euro on Hollande one year ago, maybe it is not totally crazy to gamble now.