“We must confront and defeat the ugly stain of separatism seeping through the Union flag. […] Better an imperfect union than a broken one. Better an imperfect union than a perfect divorce. […] Together, we are stronger. […]Together, we are safer. […]Together, we are richer. […] Stronger. Safer. Richer. Fairer… Together.”

The above sentences come from a speech delivered by now Prime Minister and then the Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron, in December 2007. Over the last six years, Mr. Cameron has stated his case repeatedly, in December 2012 and in April 2013. In all those speeches on the benefits of international cooperation, the PM referred to Scotland and its status within the United Kingdom. Rather unsurprisingly, he has never applied the same line of argument when discussing the United Kingdom’s position within the European Union.

Distorted image

Over the last four decades, numerous publications sought to explain the complexity of British relations with the uniting Continent. While many factors are undoubtedly at play, their influence eventually seems to depend on yet another one, namely, a distorted image Britain has, not so much of the European Union, but of itself. Let’s take just one example.

In the coming years, Britain’s position within the Union will be conditioned to a large extent on its economic performance. So far, the anti-EU campaign in Britain was presented as a crusade lead by energetic free marketers against an overblown European state – a millstone round the economy’s neck. This narrative will be more and more difficult to sustain should major continental economies come out of the crisis sooner and more vigorously than Britain: a very likely scenario, given the fact that, after three years in power, Mr. Cameron’s government is now in charge of a smaller economy than the one it inherited in 2010.

Yet, the course of British economy, and consequently, the country’s political leverage, may change significantly as soon as the Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement with the United States is signed. The new opening between the EU and the U.S. might shift the balance of power within the Union, though which way will this rebalancing go depends largely on Britain. During the negotiations, London might either lead the whole process in the name of Europe or distance itself from the EU and act rather as a middleman between the two sides, thus trying to revive its “special relationship” with Washington. The latter strategy is more likely both to occur and to backfire. Middlemen always run the risk of being cut off, and should the free trade agreement be signed without Britain, it will be a living proof to Washington that it can do good business with Europe without any mediation.

Split personality

A true Euro-American partnership is possible only if the European Union acts as a whole. Britain, because of its relatively recent loss of a global superpower status, quite understandably still has difficulty coming to terms with the new reality. The result is a split personality, which leads British diplomats to strive for conflicting goals. One day they want to play along the U.S. in the global Premiership League, the other they urge Brussels to grant Britain the status of a second Norway, Iceland or Liechtenstein – countries which on the world stage usually display much humbler ambitions.

The question is, therefore, whether Britain can give up on the already tattered “special relationship” with the U.S. as well as “special treatment” in the EU, and realize it can do much more as a fully dedicated EU member that its distant partner. It is all the more important because just as there are no indispensable people, there are no indispensible countries. In his annual expose, a few months ago, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs advocated a radically pro-European policy, claiming that the troubles in the South and British “insular aloofness” present a great opportunity for Poland – already the EU’s sixth largest economy – to get to the EU’s “most inner decision-making circle”.

What is Europe about?

The major argument for united Europe made at the time of its creation was that it guaranteed peace. When Britain joined it in 1973, it was mainly about prosperity versus economic malaise. Now it is said the case for Europe is about power versus irrelevance. Such classifications are more misleading than revealing – a united Europe should be about all these issues. Together European countries are “stronger, richer and safer” – just as the members of that other union established in 1707 the British are so familiar with.

What therefore can Europe do to keep Britain in? Quite simply, the best solution seems to be to present the British with a mirror and ask them to take a closer look.

As an American, but one very familiar with Central and Eastern Europe, I believe that integrated Europe is extremely important for several reasons. First of all, it is important for maintaining peace and stability, and thus, for overcoming terrible legacies of the Second World War, so devastating to Europe and the rest of the world. Secondly, European Union plays a crucial role in creating economic opportunities for all of its members. The current crisis should not make us forget how prosperous Europe is and can still be. Thirdly, European integration might be a driving force behind a process of creating broader sense of political identity. Europeans have so many different cultures and nationalities and there is a need to bring them together, so that they have some shared sense of community. Any European project has to take this into account, but at the same time create means for people to cultivate their own national identity at the local level.

The process of European integration has gone through a number of changes since the early 1990s. Some of them were very encouraging, and some problematic. The first dramatic change occurred right after 1989, when the long-lasting Soviet domination over a large part of the continent collapsed and many nations suddenly had to reinvent their states, drawing upon their own democratic traditions. In Poland or Czechoslovakia, as it then was, i.e. countries with some history and strong feelings for democracy, this transformation proceeded quite smoothly. In other states it was less clear on what traditions new institutions should be built. In Hungary, where I now live, there have been strong democratic traditions, but also strong authoritarian traditions, dating back to the Habsburg era. The same is certainly true of Romania, Bulgaria and other countries in the Central and Eastern Europe. These were the initial challenges, later developing in the 1990s.

At that time there were two major steps, Eastern Europeans were eager to take in order to revive and develop their democratic traditions. The first one was the NATO accession. Joining the alliance which has been at the center of the Cold War, but which was really committed to the defense of democracy, was a very important moment for them. Being admitted to the group meant becoming a member of the democratic community. The EU accession – the second of the steps – was more complicated, but perhaps even more important. Undoubtedly it created more excitement among the public, also because of some practical advantages of participating in the common market and being able to travel within the Schengen zone.

Ten years after the accession, we clearly see that at least some expectations of the public have not been met. Why? Firstly, there was a structural problem from the very outset. European Union was designed largely as an economic project and it failed to create effective instruments of political participation for the public. Centralization of the European bureaucracy in Brussels and the development of a highly structured regulatory governance system created a growing frustration among the Central European societies, and indeed among other European peoples as well. A democracy deficit at the highest levels is one of the major problems EU needs to tackle in order to develop. It has been partially addressed by the growing political influence of the European Parliament, which has become a more active player in representing opinions of the European electorate. But I think there is still a lot to be done in order to give people a sense of participation. Otherwise, they will always turn for help only to their national governments, which can sometimes act against Brussels.

The second big factor undermining trust in the European project was obviously the economic meltdown. The way the euro crisis has been managed so far seems to prove that southern and eastern regions of the EU are treated as secondary areas by the central economies of Germany, the Benelux area and to a lesser extent France. Economic instability has also created some further tensions, since people affected by the crisis want to identify the causes of it and punish those, who are allegedly to blame, i.e. immigrants and ethnic minorities. As a result in many European countries xenophobic sentiments are on the rise. The anti-immigrant, anti-Roma perspective that you see in Europe today is very disturbing. These are pan-European phenomena, not specific to the Central and Eastern Europe. Naturally, different politicians in different countries are using these processes to foster their own interests. This is particularly true in Hungary, but in other countries as well.

Will these two factors undermine the whole process of European integration? We should do all we can to prevent it. European integration is of crucial importance for the reasons of peace, stability, economic prosperity and democratic rule across the whole continent. This is even more true today than ever. That is why I was pleased to see Croatia becoming a member, and I think it is of crucial importance to bring in other Balkan countries. Dynamic European integration, even if it has serious problems today, should continue and must not be reversed.

* John Shattuk is an American legal scholar and diplomat. He was the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from 1993 to 1998, under President Bill Clinton. From 1998 to 2000 he served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic. Since 2009 he has been the President and Rector of Central European University (CEU) in Budapest. This article originally appeared in Kultura Liberalna.

He was meant not to come and he didn’t. Barack Obama decided to make Burma, Cambodia and Thailand his first foreign destinations after his re-election, revealing U.S. foreign policy priorities in the next four years. The American president plainly doesn’t have time for Europe now. It’s not a surprise, but it does require serious European deliberation and critical self reflections.

Historic Visit

Of special significance is above all Obama’s trip to Myanmar – a country under military rule since 1960’s, which until recently invariably occupied the very far end of every possible civil liberties ranking. Myanmar’s position began to change rapidly in 2010 when the new president, Thein Sein, for reasons not entirely clear, initiated democratic reforms and freed thousands of political prisoners, including the most famous regime victim, Aung San Suu Kyi, put under house arrest in 1989 and kept in custody virtually ever since. Suu Kyi was not only allowed to go on a triumphant international tour – in Oslo she finally received the Nobel Peace Prize awarded in… 1991 – but also to run in parliamentary by-elections. In April 2012 her National Democratic League won 43 of 45 seats under contention, thus becoming the largest opposition party. Only a few months after the reforms started, non-governmental organizations and independent media began to operate in a country not so long ago deemed as an “outpost of tyranny”.

And though democratic transformation in Myanmar proceeds quickly, there are still significant problems. Millions of its citizens live in extreme poverty. Hundreds of political prisoners remain in jail. The northern part of the country is being devastated by a civil war against one of many separatist groups. A military coup is an ever-present possibility, and the authenticity of president’s commitment to democracy is still difficult to assess. For these and many other reasons democratic changes in this former British colony may collapse at any time.

That despite all these uncertainties Barack Obama decided to visit Myanmar – becoming the first U.S. president in office to do so – is clear evidence of a fundamental change in American foreign policy, all the more so, because straight from Myanmar Obama flew to Thailand and then Cambodia, taking part in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit. And all this at a time when American ally, Israel, was engaged in a major military operation in Gaza, when Syria has been engulfed in a civil war for almost two years, and when Afghanistan still claims American lives on a daily basis.

Heading East… that is West

Reorientation in American foreign policy – the “Asian pivot,” as it is referred to by the White House officials – aims to strengthen U.S. presence in the Southeast Asia, turning attention away from its current involvement in the Middle East and Afghanistan, where Americans bogged down more than a decade ago. President’s visit is also a clear signal to China. Increasingly expansive foreign policy and Beijing’s massive economic influence in the region has aggravated its relations with neighboring countries, leading to serious territorial disputes with Japan on the one hand, and the Philippines and Vietnam on the other. In response to growing pressure from China, the United States already in June conducted trilateral naval exercises with Japan and South Korea in the ocean waters south of the Korean peninsula. Now, a few months later, in a speech delivered in Myanmar, President Obama left no doubts as to where Washington will concentrate its diplomatic efforts in the nearest future:

“The United States of America is a Pacific nation. We see our future as bound to those nations and peoples to our West,” he said in Rangoon.  “As our economy recovers, this is where we believe we will find tremendous growth. As we end the wars that have dominated our foreign policy for a decade, this region will be a focus of our efforts to build a prosperous peace.”

Obviously Obama’s hands are not entirely free in this matter. He cannot bring peace to Afghanistan and Iraq by decree; he will not solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor abandon American commitment to Israel; it’s beyond his powers to singlehandedly democratize Iran or foster an overnight regime change in Syria – in short, he cannot entirely give up on American involvement in the Middle East. Even the leader of the most powerful country in the world has limited room for maneuver, as he must take into account a complex interplay of geopolitical interests and honor previously taken commitments. Still, the same leader may put different emphasis on different aspects of foreign policy and make decisions that will gradually change, if not the global balance of power, then at least the focal point of global diplomacy. For many years after the Second World War the center of the world lied in Europe, later on attention moved to the Middle East. Today it is shifting again to the South-East Asia.

Does Anybody Need London?

And what role in this new order will the Old Continent play? If domestic and foreign policies of the European Union do not change dramatically, probably a marginal one. Incurable Euro-optimists may keep on hailing the Union as the largest and one of the most competitive economies in the world, but even they admit its actual importance on the global stage is disproportionately small. Obama’s visit to Asia and the latest Israeli-Palestinian conflict have once again confirmed what everybody knows but does not dare to say aloud. Alarmed by the events in the Gaza Strip, President Obama and Secretary Clinton called the leaders of several countries with the greatest influence in the region: Egypt, Turkey, France and Qatar. The idea to dial the number “to Europe,” in this case to Catherine Ashton, was not even mentioned.

European countries are rapidly losing their status of valuable partners to the United States, though some governments, especially that in London, do all in their powers to ignore this fact. On the day of Obama’s reelection, British Prime Minister David Cameron in a short interview aired by BBC congratulated the winner and expressed his hope for a close cooperation primarily in two areas: pulling the global economy out of the crisis, and helping to end the conflict in Syria. No profound geopolitical insight is needed to notice that in neither of these projects can the United Kingdom on its own may be of much assistance to the American president. Nevertheless, the bulk of British political class still seems to believe that UK’s foreign policy should be based on an Anglo-American “special relationship,” with London acting as a mediator in the dealings between America and Europe. The problem is that today Washington not only doesn’t need a middleman in its relations with the Continent – yet another side would make them even more difficult. And in fact, it’s need for the Continent itself is diminishing.

A true Euro-American partnership is possible only if the European Union acts as a whole. Many European politicians – including, I’m glad to admit, Poland’s foreign minister – are aware of this fact. Britain, probably because of its imperial past and relatively recent loss of a global superpower status, still has difficulty coming to terms with the new reality. London’s cognitive difficulties, however, seem to render Brussels increasingly impatient. They also further marginalize Europe on the international scene. Obama’s Asian trip and the way Israeli-Palestinian conflict was dealt are proofs. Hope lies with an embolden European Community to take a firmer stance towards Britain and demand a clear statement as to its future in the European club. Should this not happen, it will be another reason for presidential trips to the Old Continent to become even less frequent.

As I celebrate the glorious re-election of President Barack Hussein Obama, and as New York and my friends and family are still suffering from Hurricane Sandy, and a snowstorm follow-up, I have been in Europe, spending time with my daughter, and her family in Paris, giving a lecture and visiting Rome for the first time, and taking part in public talks in Warsaw and Gdansk on the occasion of the Polish translation of Reinventing Political Culture, offering my commentary on the American elections informed by the book. In Gdansk, I was honored to receive a medal from the European Solidarity Center for my work with Solidarność, and continuing work inspired by its principles.

I have been enjoying the joys of citizenship and patriotic hope, the love of family, and recognition for personal and public achievement. I have learned a lot in many very interesting discussions. I have been very busy, torn with mixed emotions, including a frustrated desire to put my thoughts down for Deliberately Considered. Some quick summary thoughts today; next, a close critical response to the election results and the President’s speech. In brief: Obama excelled once again as “story teller in chief.”

Election Day from afar: having cast my vote weeks ago. In Warsaw, I discussed the events of the day and the project of the reinvention of American political culture. As I have explained in previous posts and analyzed carefully in my book, I believe that Barack Obama is an agent of significant reinvention, changing the relationship between culture and power: the way he has used the politics of small things, his eloquence as an alternative to sound bite political rhetoric, retelling of the American story as one centered on diversity, as he embodies this, and his challenge to market fundamentalism, are the major contours of his transformational politics. On Election Day, I explained that as a social scientist I thought that the transformation that he has started would successfully push forward, Nate Silver enthusiast that I am. But I also confessed that as a citizen I was worried. Obama’s accomplishments to date were in danger and his promise has not yet been fulfilled. I am now hopeful.

Earlier in Rome, I spoke to a group of media students about the relationship between media and the politics of small things. We had a particularly interesting discussion about how the power of gestures work in different types of mediated settings. I explained how I think Obama has managed to use long form rhetorical skills to constitute power in the age of twitter and sound bytes. Specifically in the first debate with Romney, this wasn’t enough, but in his victory speech, he showed how this works once again. He is the most powerful person in the world thanks to his speech making.

I also told my Rome colleagues that I was pretty sure that the re-election of Barack Obama would make it likely that the next President of the United States would be Hillary Clinton or another woman nominee of the Democratic Party (I will explain my grounds for this conviction in a future post)

This led to an intriguing discussion. A post doc in the audience observed that the power of Obama’s speech is informed by a specific tradition of oratory, that of the African American civil rights leaders coming from the African American church. She wondered whether there is a comparable tradition among feminist political leaders, supposing that there wasn’t. The voice of African American authority empowers Obama, while the feminist authoritative voice is one of contemporary invention. This led me to wonder about a discussion I had with feminist friends during the Democratic primary season in 2007-8. Which would be the more significant breakthrough Hillary Clinton or Obama? I thought that given the legacies of slavery, the election of Barack Obama would be, but perhaps I was wrong.

In Warsaw, I spoke with two groups, associated with two cultural journals, Kultura Liberalna and Respublika Nowa, the former was an informal meeting in a private apartment, the latter, a meeting at the journal’s offices, which included a cultural center. These groups are part of a reinvigorated intellectual scene in Poland, young intellectuals seeking alternatives in a highly problematic political environment. In both meetings, we talked about possible collaboration with Deliberately Considered.

In the Election Day meetings, I reflected on the fact that what I had to say that day would be speculative, while in my next meetings in Gdansk, if I was right, they would appear as having been inevitable. Before the results and after, I observed how the project of reinventing American political culture was proceeding. How changes in attitudes toward questions of American identity and the relation between the state and the market, the rejection of market fundamentalism are advancing.  I expected Obama to win and he did. I explained before the fact that as a social scientist, I judged Nate Silver’s prognostications to be sound and thought it was highly likely that Obama would win.  The changes he has advanced are compelling, and they are backed by hard demographic, economic and political realities.  But I confessed that I was worried as a citizen, so much was on the line.

I knew when I left home that how comfortable I would feel at home when I returned depended on the outcome of the elections. By the time, I had my meetings in Gdansk, I felt very comfortable.

The first meeting, the day after election day, included a formal ceremony and discussion of the Polish translation of my book as it informed an understanding of the outcome of the elections and Obama’s Presidency. The second meeting, was the first session at a conference on the future of Europe, with focus on the Eastern half, in and outside of the Euro zone. I was asked, among other things, what was the significance of the election results and what America could contribute to an understanding of the crisis in Europe.

I answered both questions by highlighting the great transformation occurring in the United States, facilitated by the President.  In 1789, an American republic centered on the idea of liberty, in the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln reinvented the idea of America, or more precisely, he gave voice to the reinvention that was developing, by making the principle of equality also central. He turned the Declaration of Independence into a central normative text, as Garry Wills powerfully has demonstrated. I think, and explained in Gdansk, that Barack Obama has also added a new critical note, using similar means. Diversity is becoming a central American principle and the basis of identity.  Obama in all his major speeches and in his actions is  charging the great seal motto E pluribus unum with new meaning and application. Diversity as the basis of our unity is now defined as central to our identity, concerning race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, and much more. This is new, powerfully pushed forward by Obama and supported by American opinion and by demography. This is the renewed American story and recognized strength. I will explain more fully in my next post.

“All truths – not only the various kinds of rational truth but also factual truth – are opposed to opinion in their mode of asserting validity. Truth carries within itself an element of coercion, and the frequently tyrannical truthtellers may be caused less by a failing of character than by the strain of habitually living under a kind of compulsion.” – Hannah Arendt (Between Past and Future. 1954, p. 243)

During the period immediately before someone leaves one city and moves to another, they seem to liberate themselves and experiment with abandon during that window of freedom, or fearfully adhere to the tired routines of a forgone order. Having witnessed the Eurocrisis unfold over the past two years from a window in Berlin, I recently thought I would have to move elsewhere due to conflict with the archaic hierarchy of a German university. I naturally rebelled and charged heedlessly into the freedom inherent in a contingent situation – refusing to comply with the hierarchy and arbitrary exercise of power so prevalent in the German university. With the comfortable order of my German life on the brink, I attempted to understand my position in German academia, as well as the European position under German hegemony. In so doing, I came to discover that the latter is not a debate between Keynesianism vs. neoliberal austerity, but a particularly virulent condition of wider academic and German culture: the need for truth.

If a traditional German university is a window into German culture as a whole, then the problem of truth becomes immediately apparent. Imagine riding horseback through the patchwork of political entities in medieval Germany, each with an independent lord holding absolute power over a small slice of territory, beholden only to the good grace of a distant and disinterested central authority. While riding through this landscape, the casual observer cannot help but notice that when moving from one lordship to another, the organization of labor and adherence to a unifying conception of community is entirely dictated by the lord. Some territories have jovial lords who interact with their subjects, interested in seeing smiling faces on their townsfolk and full bellies in the peasantry. Others sit aloof in marble palaces patronizing a small circle of followers and sycophants, while browbeating the remainder into perpetual worship and servitude. In each case, the truth is held by the lord, and the lords themselves are at almost constant war with each other, attempting to extend their vision of truth across the land. Because each professor in a German university effectively governs an entire department, with an army of student assistants, research assistants and post-docs, this medieval image illuminates the culture of a traditional German university. Unsurprisingly, the “market” for those lower but rather well-paid positions is brutal and precarious, and switching between lords becomes an exercise in switching between truths.

Extended to the German dominions themselves, certain truths are self-evident among the mainstream, functioning at the federal level. The law is sacred. The state is sacred. The economy is sacred. The currency is sacred. The four mainstream parties, the Conservatives, the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Greens are surprisingly adept at working togetherafter accepting these truths – at least compared to the polarized American environment. Of course, the Left, emerging from the Communist East and persisting over the years, has been a pariah to the mainstream, while the recent success of the Pirates is just downright baffling. The response to these outsiders is a mixture of aggressive repudiation, particularly towards the Left (You dangerous lunatics want to bring the GDR back!), or sneering contempt (what do these pothead idiots dressed as Pirates want anyway?). In each case, the outsider is considered a threat not only in the traditional understanding of violence and theft, but also because their positions are invalid. Thus, they are simply wrong, false, in error – a threat not simply to order, but to the truth.

Brought to the European level, behind the intractable German position on austerity is not so much an essentialist identity, moralizing about hard work and responsibility, but a feeling of compulsion among the elites driven by “the truth” of the situation. After all, how can a Haushalt spend more than it takes in? What other solution is there but for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (“the PIIGS”) to “get their houses in order”? What can open market operations by the European Central Bank (ECB) lead to but inflation? These are truths!

Of course, there is no “German Truth” to which all citizens adhere. The political culture is quite vibrant, diverse and filled with plenty of activists who have been at the forefront of anti-fascism as well as movements similar to Occupy. Nevertheless, there is a tendency, particularly among those in positions of power, to possess a form of aggressive self-assurance that they themselves hold the truth in isolation from all others. Because it is the truth, those in inferior positions must comply. Yet, it is precisely this combination, holding the truth in isolation and expecting others to comply, which generates the result any casual observer would expect: the social isolation of that person. This alienating self-assurance manifests itself not only in the lordships of German academia, but also in the acrimonious conflicts over the Eurocrisis. The two best examples of this are probably the two most important Germans in Europe at the moment: Angela Merkel and Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann – the most powerful council member on the board of the European Central Bank (ECB).

Merkel, a consistent advocate of austerity under the folksy belief that national budgets are just like household budgets – something John Maynard Keynes laboriously tried to discredit – finally got what she deserved this summer: isolation. With the replacement of French President Sarkozy by Socialist François Hollande, Italian Prime Minster Mario Monti quickly formed an alliance against Merkel’s dominance and effectively forced her into isolation. The result was a defeat for Merkel’s beliefs and the further extension of European-level credit to troubled countries.

On the other hand, if Merkel is stubborn in her timeless wisdom, Weidmann is as unyielding as a mathematical equation. Following his interview in Der Spiegel, one wonders if this trained economist would like to see Europe in ruins just to prove true whatever macroeconomic paradigm he functions under. Although quite young and only on the job for little over a year, scarcely a month after Merkel’s defeat, Weidmann was likewise isolated on the board of the ECB. The ECB subsequently plans to move forward with open market operations – exactly what Weidmann wanted to avoid.

In the end, it is clear Europe is moving towards a new order, or, more figuratively, moving from one city to another. If “the truth” of the old order is already forgone, we can only hope that the leaders of the transition liberate themselves from its routines. But, if my personal experience with the German university is any indication, or perhaps also that of Monti and his allies, directly challenging the truth tellers of the old city is the only way to move forward to a new one. We can only hope that such a challenge brings the truth out of isolation and into rational public debate.

To skip this introduction and go directly to Minas Samatas’s In-Depth Analysis of the Greek Election, click here.

It is clear. The recent election in Greece was of critical importance. The fate of that country, of Europe and the global economy all seemed to be in the balance. The establishment reading of those in power in Berlin and other European capitals, and in Washington, as well, was that a victory by the leftist party SYRIZA would be a disaster. On the day of the election, we presented an alternative view by Despina Lalaki .

Today, Minas Samatas deliberately considers the results, suggesting that even though SYRIZA did not win the recent contest, it is winning in the long run and that this is a good thing for very sober reasons. He explores the unprecedented interference in the election by European media and officials. He highlights the way the old guard parties and their supportive media framed the election. He presents the results in some detail. He maintains that the present political configuration will not last. And he thus concludes on a hopeful note:

“The revival of the parliamentary left in France, Italy and Greece, plus the sorely needed, from the point of view of Greece and Europe, re-election of President Obama in the U.S., bring some hope for a developmental turn against the irrationality of austerity in the European crisis and democratic reforms in the European Union. The concept of a unified Europe has been shaken to the core. If the Greek election serves as a wake up call and has promoted a recognition of a necessary change of course, it will be a real democratic win for the people of Europe, and beyond.”

To read “The Greek Election, June 17th, 2012” click here.

The subsequent general elections of June 17 led to a flood of attention in the international media and blatant foreign intervention due to their potential economic implications for the Euro currency zone and the global economy. Observers were concerned that a Greek exit from the Euro would have a catastrophic impact on other ailing European states, damaging the US and the entire global economy. There was an unprecedented campaign orchestrated by the Eurocrats, the German government and the German media, which amounted to the blackmailing of the Greek electorate to vote against the parties that want to end the draconian austerity and neoliberal policies.

E.U. officials disregarded the norm of neutrality concerning an independent national election and expressed their opinion about their preferred outcome of Greeks’ vote, threatening “Grexit,” i.e., forcing Greece out of Euro zone, if the radical left wins. The intervention crescendo came on the eve of the election with an open letter of Germany’s Bild newspaper to Greek voters. The tabloid warned:

“Tomorrow you have elections but you do not have any choices….If you don’t want our billions, you are free to elect any left- or right-wing clowns that you want…For more than two years, though, your ATMs are only issuing euros because we put them there. If the parties that want to end austerity and reforms win the elections, they will be breaching all agreements and we will stop paying.”

But it was not only threats by the media and the Euro-area governments. After the May election results, part of Greece’s next aid payment (1billion Euros) was postponed as a warning to Greek politicians and voters to stick to the austerity program.

Repeated Eurocratic interventions over the month before the election of June 17 implied a deep disapproval of potential choices by free citizens. This began in February, when German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble made the incredible suggestion that Greece should hold off the election and allow the interim government led by the banker Lucas Papademos to stay in power. This revealed a neoliberal German and European Union leadership that has become scared of democracy, unable to deal with the uncomfortable realities that elections can produce.

The foreign led “Grexit” campaign was combined with a domestic “Drachmageddon” terrorist campaign that propagated the notion of total catastrophe if Greece were to go back to the Greek national currency the Drachma, orchestrated by the media with close relations with the corrupt ruling parties of New Democracy and PASOK.

Those of us who have studied foreign interventions in Greece in the past can’t recall such a blatant foreign interference, with its effective co-ordinated scaremongering. As a result, the elections on June 17^th produced a vote of fear to avert a bleak Greek future, superseding the vote of anger against the corrupted political system of the elections of May 6^th.

It is also crucial to note that the great majority of Greeks has repeatedly expressed in polls and also on May 6^th elections in favor of the Euro, though clearly against the  “memorandum,” i.e., the draconian austerity bailout program, enforced by the troika, EU, IMF and ECB. That is why the Eurocrats and the Greek ruling forces tried and succeeded to transform the elections of June 17 into a referendum about Euro and not about the memorandum. Angela Merkel herself had called the Greek President to suggest the official transformation of the election into a referendum in favor of the currency. Hence, scaremongering campaigns for “Grexit” and “Drachmageddon” defined the June 17^th elections to be a de facto referendum on Greece’s future with the Euro, between leftist Alexis Tsipras’s Syriza Party, which opposes the terms of the country’s latest bailout, and its conservative rival, Antonis Samaras’s New Democracy party, which largely supports the bailout program, the ND with PASOK together are the “ancient regime.” Nonetheless, while the June election amounted to a referendum on whether Greece would become the first country to be forced out of Euro, it is quite certain that if a real referendum about the austerity bailout program, the vast majority of suffering Greeks would have voted against it.

The elections results

After all these orchestrated campaigns, on June 17, the conservative New Democracy (ND) came in the first place with 29.66%, from 18.9% in the previous vote, getting 129 seats in the parliament, including 50-seat bonus that goes to the leading party. The leftist SYRIZA jumped to 26.89% from 16.8%, holding 71 seats. It is followed in third place by the socialist PASOK, which fell to 12.28% from 13.2%, now holding only 33 seats, down from 157 in 2009.  The newly formed nationalist populist party of Independent Greeks which managed to get 10.6% in May is now in fourth place with 7.51% votes and 20 seats. Unfortunately for the Greek democracy, Golden Dawn came in fifth. This extreme neo-fascist party, with members who have been linked with violent attacks on African and Asian immigrants, maintained its power 6.92% (7%) and occupies 18 seats, down from the 21 it elected in May. The moderate “Democratic Left” came in sixth, with 6.26% (from 6.11%) and 17 seats. Last, in seventh, was the Greek Communist party KKE, which only got 4.50% (down from 8.5% in May) and 12 seats, refusing  any cooperation with SYRIZA.

The polarization of voting between ND and SYRIZA squeezed small parties like the Ecologist Greens, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and “Drasi,” which this time all fell well short of the 3 percent threshold needed for them to enter Parliament. A new abstention record was reached, 37.53%, higher than the 34.9% in May. About half of the young voters between 18-29, suffering from 50% unemployment, voted for SYRIZA, and those over 60, fearful pensioners and women over 55, voted ND for staying with the Euro.

Hence, Greece’s second national elections produced a narrow victory for the conservative New Democracy by 2.4 percentage points over leftist SYRIZA. However, Mr. Samaras of the New Democracy party, who declared that “Athens would honor its commitments” made in exchange for rescue loans from the EU and IMF, has only 129 of Parliament’s 300 seats, and lacks enough MPs to govern alone. He sought allies among his traditional rival, the pro-bailout PASOK, which came third, and the small Democratic Left party, which, while opposing the country’s harsh austerity program, has declared it will help to form a strong government. So, these three parties managed to forge a pro-euro and pro-bailout coalition government, backed by 179 out of 300 MPs.

The ND narrow victory, the coalition government and the real winner

Antonis Samaras was sworn in as prime minister of a three-party coalition government promising to uphold Greece’s international bailout commitments. Samaras two coalition partners, PASOK leader Evangelos Venizelos and Fotis Kouvelis of Democratic Left, have decided not to provide MPs for cabinet positions.

The real election winner is, though, in my judgment, SYRIZA, which saw its percentage of the vote rocket from less than 5 percent in 2009 to 17 percent in May to 27 percent in June. SYRIZA has made clear that it will not take part in any government or national negotiation team for a better memorandum. SYRIZA, with the anti-austerity wind in its sails, will be a powerful opposition force, insisting that the memorandum lacks popular legitimacy, having been effectively annulled by the strong anti-austerity vote in May. Mr. Tsipras, campaigning to reject the bailout terms and yet keep Greece in the euro, repeatedly stressed his party’s commitment to the common currency. To defend against the conservative pro-Euro arsenal, he eschewed any reference to radical positions the party holds on repudiating the national debt or nationalizing the banks.

In my view, unlike its name as a Coalition of Radical Left, SYRIZA is by no means  a communist radical movement; this is clear to the well informed American administration and media, which were not polemically against its leader Alexis Tsipras. SYRIZA, like the initial PASOK in the 80s under Andreas Papandreou, is a leftist reformist, multi-group coalition, attracting  mostly young people, the leftist intelligentsia, and the now state dependent middle strata, which has been disappointed by PASOK.  SYRIZA can play a modernizing role against the corrupted political system, similar to the role played by PASOK in 1981 against the prolong right wing rule. In its effort to be able to form the next government after a predicted failure of the present pro-bail out government, SYRIZA will be transformed into a governmental party, obliged to abandon its leftist radicalism, and gradually, like the PASOK governments, will disappoint its leftist followers. Rather than victory now, 38 year old Tsipras very well may be happier to emerge as a formidable and strengthened opposition leader, waiting for his leftist movement to become mature as a governmental party in order to succeed the coalition government’s predestined failure and short life.

Post elections assessments and prospects

The June elections has temporarily enabled Greece to avoid “Grexit” and “Drachmageddon,” and relieved the EU leaders with the formation of a pro-austerity government. One could argue that it is another temporary win for the Ancien Regime, which will just encourage Greece overlords to be more draconian. A government made up of the same political parties carrying the burden of the same old sins is incapable of resolving the Greek crisis. Without substantial European help, it will collapse soon.

In my judgment, if SYRIZA had won, it by no means would have resulted in a Armageddon for Greece and EU; because such a victory would have triggered drastic economic and political changes in Greece and in Europe more broadly. Europe’ s leaders, and Germany’s in particular, would have been forced to find the resources and imagination to reform the euro zone and advance the European integration.

Unfortunately to this point, following the election, Germany, IMF and the EU continue to demand that Greece honors the terms of the crucifying bailout that unrealistically assumes a quick economic recovery despite draconian austerity and crushing debts. Germans sadistically insist that Greece must continue take its disciplinary medicine – a 25% fall in GDP, collapse in living standards and youth unemployment of 50% – and pursue a neoliberal reform of its economic structures. For Germany, Greece’s draconian disciplinary austerity experiment is providing important lessons for other southern European “PIIGS.” But even if Grexit and losses  of the Greek debt might be containable, what would not be containable is the fear among member states  such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy that their countries could suffer the same fate as Greece.

After the financial problems in Portugal, Ireland and now in Spain, it is obvious that  the Greek crisis is not endemic and its cause is not the unruly Greeks. We have seen how many weak links there are in the European chain, which have nothing to do with Greece. As famous American economists, notably including Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, have argued, the origins of crisis that is tearing Greece apart, and threatens to spread across Europe, can be found in the deeply flawed European monetary system. There must be a wholesale redesign of the EU economic structure. This and not the destruction of the Greek economy is the answer to the crisis.

Will the new Greek government be offered further forgiveness of its foreign debts, a moratorium on further cuts in the social wage and an opportunity to stimulate the economy with a range of infrastructure projects financed by European funds? Greece and Southern Europe need something closer to a Marshall Plan than more austerity, but the German neoliberal government and its northern partners refuse to acknowledge this. Instead, they will continue half-measures and moralistic lessons that have resulted in the destruction of the Greek economy and society, and which have grown to present a threat to EU as a whole.

The revival of the parliamentary left in France, Italy and Greece, plus the sorely needed, from the point of view of Greece and Europe, re-election of President Obama in the U.S., bring some hope for a developmental turn against the irrationality of austerity in the European crisis and democratic reforms in the European Union. The concept of a unified Europe has been shaken to the core. If the Greek election serves as a wake up call and has promoted a recognition of a necessary change of course, it will be a real democratic win for the people of Europe, and beyond.

The economic crisis in Greece is heading towards yet another showdown today. The Greek electorate threatens to strike a serious blow against neoliberalism and its European offshoot. At the same time, these elections promise to unravel the Greek state’s monopoly on the structures of violence and fear.

Sociologist Charles Tilly drew a compelling analogy between the state as the place of organized means of violence, and racketeering. He defined the racketeer “as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction,” in order to gain control and consolidate power. In this regard, a state and its government differ little from racketeering, to the extent that the threats against which they protect their citizens are imaginary or are consequences of their own activities.

Considering the pain, the humiliation, and the social degradation that the economic and political policies of the Greek government have inflicted upon the country the past four years, Tilly’s analogy may offer us a useful tool to both describe and evaluate the current crisis and the regime of fear that the state has unleashed on the Greek public.

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which is now a democratic socialist party in name only, governed Greece for almost 30 years, moving steadily from Keynesian economic policies in the 1980s to rampant neoliberalism in the 1990s. New Democracy (ND), which had dominated the political scene until PASOK’s first electoral victory in 1981 and alternated in power with it ever since, professed its ideology to be “radical liberalism.” Today, after three decades of cronyism, unbridled corruption and economic scandals, the ideological convergence of the two parties is complete.

Despite its initial apprehension towards the European Union, membership in the organzation enabled PASOK to implement its policies and boost the Greek economy. With the help of substantial financial inflows from the European Economic Community, PASOK was able to redistribute wealth.

Despite the growing government deficits, the emphasis remained on sustaining employment and modernizing the welfare system. In the meantime, democratic socialism – enveloped in patronage and nepotism – evolved into a process for democratizing corruption. Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos’s infamously vulgar statement in 2010 – “We [the government and citizens] fooled away the money together” – alluded to government-bred tactics which for years secured positions for its electorate in an ever-expanding bureaucratic machine.

Under the weight of economic scandals, pressure from PASOK’s “modernizing wing”, and the Maastricht Treaty’s aim to bring about monetary convergence by 1998, the Greek government launched an extensive program liberalizing the financial and banking sector, slashing government subsidies and pensions, deregulating the labor market and privatizing more than 100 companies from 1994 to 1999.

Some of the most prominent of these businesses included: AGET-Hercules, the cement company that literally built Greece after World War II, the Hellenic shipyards, Piraiki-Patraiki, a textile industry that in the 1980s was the second-largest employer after the Greek public sector, and ETVA, the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank. New Democracy, which governed briefly between 1990 and 1993, effectively championed the same policies.

The implementation of neoliberal policies, increasingly executed by an emerging new breed of technocrat politicians, was often met with strong resistance by labor unions and powerful interest groups which for years had enjoyed the state’s protection. Economic scandals underscored the “restructuring” process. When AGET-Hercules was sold for a fraction of its value to a nearly bankrupt Italian industrial group, extreme violence erupted. The assassination of Michael Vranopoulos, a former chief of State Bank who had handled the sale, by the terrorist group November 17, highlighted the public’s discontent.

The largely tolerant attitudes of the Greek public towards November 17, which operated from 1975 until 2002 with an anti-American, anti-capitalist agenda – it was viewed almost as a modern Robin Hood – reflected Greeks’ increasing frustration with the political establishment. Most importantly, this predisposition reflected people’s inability to effectively react.

The Greek state has always had a tight grip on society, and Greek society has always had a love-hate relationship with the state. Strongly dependent on the state for employment in an ever-expanding public sector, which was tied up with unions that over the years had come under the control of the government, the Greek public often vented its dissatisfaction with riots, protests and strikes, largely orchestrated by the parties of the Left. But it was unable to fundamentally challenge a system that was excluding them from decision-making processes.

But Greece’s booming economy at the time – fuelled by the adoption of the euro, easy credit conditions, and substantial transfers from the EU – painted the picture of a seemingly prosperous society. In reality, a small elite was reaping vast profits from the government’s neoliberal policies, while the lower and middle classes paid the hefty price, as the massive Greek stock exchange scandal of 1999-2000 highlights.

A central role of the state is that of offering protection to its citizens. “Protection,” however, as Tilly suggests, echoes two contrasting tones: a comforting and an ominous one. It calls forth images of shelter against danger provided by a powerful friend, an insurance policy or a sturdy roof. It also evokes, however, the racket in which a local strong man, for instance, forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage – damage he himself threatens to deliver – or a neighborhood mobster who claims to be a brothel’s best guarantee of operation free of police interference.

The death spiral that the Greek economy entered in 2008 called for all the government protection that the public could use. Instead, the government signed up for the financial bailout packages imposed by the so-called “troika,” the European Committee, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The packages included a series of unprecedented austerity measures which brought the lower and middle classes to their knees, while leaving intact the privileges of the financial elites and their political aides.

As a result of the tremendous economic pressure, the government had started losing its tight grip on Greek society as far back as 2008. Massive protests triggered by the police killing of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a 15-year-old student, expressed young people’s increasing frustration with the prospect of a bleak future.

By the spring of 2011, a whole new movement had been galvanised. The “Indignant Citizens Movement,” an offshoot of the Spanish Indignados, occupied central Athens’ Syntagma Square for four months. Organized collectively and independent from any party or trade union affiliation, the movement was another indication that the government was governing without the consent of the people. Civil disobedience and organizations dedicated to collective action sprung up to deal with the pauperization unleashed by austerity.

The backlash has been a campaign of fear, which on occasion escalates into outright terror. Instilling fear in its clientele is the primary mechanism employed by any racketeer. The violent suppression of mass protests, the detention of undocumented immigrants, and the arrest and public display on the Greek police’s website of 12 prostitutes infected with HIV have had a single goal: to terrorize the Greek public and ultimately offer “protection” against the dissidents, anarchists, protesters, and immigrants. The rise of Golden Dawn, the neo-Nazi party, which won about seven per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections in May, was the direct result of these practices.

Fear is the sovereign’s predicament, as 17th-century political philosopher Hobbes has shown – not a natural emotion, but one cultivated through a system of moral education conducted by state institutions and their affiliates, most prominently, in our days, by the media. When these institutions lose legitimacy, their tactics may ultimately backfire, as the May elections showed. The rise of Syriza, a coalition of anti-austerity leftist parties ahead of today’s elections has triggered a new round of propaganda alluding to a communist takeover, loss of private property, alienation from the markets and the international community, and most importantly, to a financial Armageddon.

In defiance of this fear, an awakening of political consciousness is taking place in Greece’s squares, streets, and online social networks, not merely condemning the policies of austerity and social degradation but collectively working towards new types of political resistance. It is becoming clear that only the people of Greece can deliver and ultimately save themselves from the racketeering, criminal practices of their “protectors”.

This article was first published by Al Jazeera English network on June 15, 2012.

The European Left seems on the rise. With left-of-center parties doing very well in elections in France, Greece, and Germany, it is tempting to read these elections as part of a broader repudiation of the conservative EU project of fiscal stability and indifference to unemployment. And surely, no election in Europe these days is removed from the question of where the EU is going.

Yet, the German elections, in the provinces/states of Schleswig-Holstein and North-Rhine Westphalia, were primarily provincial elections about provincial problems. At the same time, the recent election in North Rhine-Westphalia reveals interesting dimensions of how people negotiate the financial crisis at the provincial level.

The elections in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) had become necessary because the liberal party inadvertently brought down the minority government of the Social Democrats and the Green Party. The occasion was a fight over the budget in which the liberals wanted to appeal to their anti-tax constituency and at the same time support their minority government. Germany is not used to minority governments. Hence, those who deal with minority governments do not necessarily understand the arcane legal and political rules involved in keeping minority governments alive.

The results:

The elections worked well for the two parties that had formed the minority government: the Social Democrats received 39.1% of the vote (up by 4.6%) and the Greens 11.3% (down by 0.8%). The Christian Democratic Union, the party of Chancellor Merkel, received a disappointing 26.3% (down 8.3%). The Liberals, whose grandstanding had caused the election, came out with a surprisingly high 8.6%. The Pirate Party, barely visible in the last election, scored a strong 7.8%. What do these results mean? Who and what has won?

First, women won. Hannelore Kraft and Sylvia Löhrmann, the leading candidates for the Social Democrats and the Greens, respectively, converted their minority government into a solid majority. This is not just about gender, but about gender in an interesting way.

Kraft and Löhrmann won not in spite of their gender. They used it, by mobilizing a non-confrontational and caring form of femininity that resonated with the voters. They did not campaign against one another. From the beginning, they were committed to form a coalition. Hence, Kraft did not engage in the macho politics of first trying to get as many votes as possible and then trying to woo an attractive coalition partner. Both women were also aided by the fact that Norbert Röttgen, the candidate for the Christian Democratic Union, had only committed to moving to NRW if he won the election. In the case of a loss, a possibility that has turned into reality, he would stay in Berlin as the Federal Minister of the Environment. Kraft, in contrast, seemed committed to the province instead of maximizing career opportunities.

The elections not only vindicated a non-confrontational and caring style of politics. The minority government’s impressive record on social issues, centering on school reform and support for youth and families, impressed the voters. For example, the minority government managed to solve a conflict on schooling that seemed intractable. The classic German school system segregates students by perceived ability starting in grade five. This system exacerbates existing social inequalities. Conservative parents stridently oppose the closer integration of the different forms of schools in the name of meritocracy. Kraft managed to diffuse the conflict by allowing municipalities to decide between different models of secondary schools. This compromise is likely to improve the conditions of schooling for many children from working class and immigrant families.

The election signals support of German voters for the welfare state, but it is the local, provincial welfare state at home. It is far from clear that these same voters would support the conditions of possibility for a welfare state that need to be present at the EU level or a general commitment to the welfare state in the EU. The voters would like a caring, anticipatory welfare state in NRW, but probably not similar provisions in a Greek state that is financially dependent on the EU.

Crises often breed new parties, or they buoy extremist parties that have existed on the fringes. What is to report on this front? The Pirate Party is on the rise. It is now represented in four German provincial parliaments. The Pirates bundle the energy, skills, and values of young voters and combine it with the enthusiasm of older citizens who feel that no party properly represents them. The results are promising. The party’s core issues are copyright, civil liberties, internet regulation, and general transparency in politics. They field candidates that have only recently begun to be active in politics. They are, in a political way, cute. And they are important. They compete with the old liberal parties that have focused on lowering taxes rather than defending civil liberties, as well as with the leftist parties that have become too entrenched, used to compromise, and unimaginative. One Pirate demand, for example, is to provide free local public transportation in order to reduce traffic and make the right to mobility real for low-income people. The Pirates are a product of the crisis; their membership is made up of people who did not feel at home in the other parties. Given their outlook and their radical democratic practices, I can only hope that they are here to stay, to remind us that democracy can be more meaningful if we can participate more meaningfully and take up the opportunities we have.

What, then, can we make of the NRW election? It was not a vote on the EU, on Greece, on the Euro, or even on the future of the welfare state. It was a local election. Yet this election gives the hope for a style of politics that is cooperative, post-macho, open to compromise, and committed to social justice, with a good dose of new inventive Pirate politics. It is still too early to say how much of this spirit carries over into the 2013 German national elections.

In this post, Minas Samatas, Professor of Political Sociology, University of Crete, reports that while the Greeks said no to draconian austerity, no to the two ruling parties, and no to European threats of Greece’s exit from euro zone, “Grexit,” they suggested a new path for a democratically legitimate European Union. -Jeff

Μay 6^th elections in Greece have sent a loud and clear message: the Greek people said no to the draconian austerity measures that have devastated the country in exchange for dead-end bailouts from the troika of European Union (EU), European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Designed by IMF and Eurocrats, the bailout “memorandum” does not guarantee a safe path to move Greece away from disaster, even if implemented in full. The austerity policy gives absolute priority for paying creditors at the expense of citizens’ incomes, without any future prospect of development and growth. It promotes sharp reductions in public spending, shattering the healthcare and educational system, and the “Balkanization” of Greece with salaries under 200 Euros comparable to Bulgaria. The Greek electorate rejected this in no uncertain terms.

They also, and very importantly, said no to the two ruling parties, punishing the socialist PASOK and conservative New Democracy (ND). They are responsible for the dramatic economic crisis and signed the disastrous austerity program (memorandum) to protect the foreign creditors and the banks at the expense of the most vulnerable. The outcome of the ballot expressed anger against the corrupted political elite and its policies. It expressed dismay at the lack of punishment of those responsible for the crisis. It was a call for social justice for those who suffer from the crisis. The election results express the fear and despair of the Greek people affected by the memorandum’s inhumane policy, lurching deeper into poverty and despair by sharp salary and pensions cuts, unfair tax increases, 22% unemployment (with 922 people losing their job per day over the past year), leaving no future for the young people but immigration, leading to over 3,000 persons to suicide.

The results:

The conservative New Democracy (ND) came in first place with only 18.9% of the vote, followed by the leftist SYRIZA (16.8%) and by the socialist PASOK (13.2%) in third, followed by the Independent Greeks (10.6%) a splinter party from ND in fourth, and in fifth the Greek Communist party KKE (8.5%), which refuses to cooperate with anyone in government, followed by Golden Dawn, the  extreme right-wing party, 7% (the big shock) in sixth, and the moderate “Democratic Left,” a party which gathered splinter deputies from SYRIZA and PASOK with 6.11 % of the vote in seventh. The Ecologist Greens with 2.93 % and Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) (2.9%) failed to enter the parlament, given the 3% minimum entry. Also a group of small, neo-liberal, pro-business parties “the Democratic Alliance” “Drasi,” and “Creativity Again” failed to enter parliament. A record 34.9% of voters abstained.

These results are a clear defeat of the pro-memorandum forces (PASOK and ND), which want to keep Greece in the euro zone (EZ) at any cost and signed the latest loan agreement. They gathered a combined record low of 32 %. This is a rejection of the governing parties since 1974. The political patron client system collapsed because the two parties can no longer accommodate their clients due to the state bankruptcy.

The elections were won by those who are against the memorandum, but want to stay in euro zone, though not on “Merkozy” and IMF austerity terms. Only the Greek Communist Party (KKE) unambiguously calls for Greece’s exit from both EU and EZ.

There are dangers revealed in the results. Austerity and national humiliation by the crude scapegoating of Greeks abroad has caused anger, racism, xenophobia and ultra nationalism. Hence the ballot brought the neo-Nazi “Golden Dawn” in parliament, with 21 out of 300 seats. The first neo-Nazi party to enter a European parliament since WWII won votes throughout the country, even in places devastated by the Nazis. Along with the “Golden Dawn,” the hard-right nationalists “Independent Greeks” entered the parliament, using rabid nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

The results also suggest new promise. The surprise winner in May 6^th election was SYRIZA, the Coalition of the Radical Left, which easily beat PASOK, sweeping all of the greater Athens region and Thessaloniki. Led by 38 years old Alexis Tsipras, the party is in favor of remaining in the euro zone and the European Union, unlike the Communist Party, but has opposed the loan agreement. SYRIZA’ s charismatic leader succeeded in integrating a broad spectrum of anti-memorandum forces: disillusioned PASOK voters, the indignant protesters in the squares, the young occupiers of schools and government buildings, the organizers of solidarity networks and barter alternative exchange systems. Based on his party’s remarkable surge to 16.78 %, Tsipras has written to EU officials to declare the memorandum deal null and void because a total of 68 % of voters rejected the terms of the EU-IMF bailout.

With seven parties in Parliament and none gaining more than 20%, the elections destroyed the post-dictatorial political system of the past 38 years and opened the way for new political forces, which however are not eager for cooperation, both before the elections and after. Yet, the ballot does not give enough parliamentary seats for a majority government. Therefore, it seems that the deadlock will be resolved by new elections in June 17, which are considered anathema for the established parties and creditors. It seems that democracy is not really welcome in the euro zone, which prefers appointed technocrats, like ex-bankers Monti in Italy and Papademos in pre-election Greece. But the new election suggests the possibility of a new beginning, despite the concerns of the European establishment.

Has Germany and its northern European partners got the loud message of the Greek elections into easing their fiscal demands on Greece or make them push Greece out of the euro zone? Can Greece negotiate the memorandum terms with its creditors without risking its place in EZ? The Troika and especially Chancellor Merkel have blatantly threatened a Greek euro zone exit, “Grexit,” if Greeks don’t accept and implement the painful memorandum.

Although they want the euro, the Greeks voted in defiance of IMF and EZ threats. And I think it is important to recognize that despite scaremongering by the pro–memorandum forces and media, Greece still has negotiating power, because the Greek crisis is a European one. In my judgment, sooner rather than later, foreign lenders will realize they have imposed an unsound policy, transforming Greece into a Weimar type of republic, providing a foretaste of what will happen to Portugal, Spain, Italy, or even France.

Grexit should not be the cost Greeks have to pay to get rid of a rotten political system and get back their dignity and autonomy. The potential new Greek, European and global catastrophe can be averted if the Greek defiance is backed by other “revolting Europeans.” The practical reasonableness of this approach has been underscored by Paul Krugman. Opposition to market dictatorship and the euro zone unilateral austerity in Southern Europe is the way to restore the “European project” with a policy of growth, promoting closer integration through democratic mandate. The Greek election has presented an important new beginning.