At the same time, one of the pressing initial problems of such work for anyone that decided to undertake it would be precisely the thing that I suspect marks the differences seen in this discussion: contradicting claims about who is able to claim Tea Party membership and what the purposes and values of the Tea Party and indeed conservatism are.

Discussions of this kind often happen “off the front page,” as it were (as is typical in most groups), but reading, for example, conservative commenting forums online or attending Tea Party events, one often sees/hears discussions of this sort emerge.

Point 1: I should have made much more clear that I was specifically referencing the new conservatism that has emerged in recent elections in the U.S., as specifically represented by the Tea Party rank-and-file.

Point 2: There is indeed a difference between a critique and rejection. I’d argue that there are assorted valid critiques of the practical tendencies of the Enlightenment as a way of knowing, a system of values, and a historical set of individuals, circumstances, and projects. But to suggest that no current self-described conservatives reject it is to ignore much of the thrust of present conservative activity in science, policy, and culture. True, in some cases they don’t reject it in those terms, but many concisely suggest the substitution of religious dogma for or priority of it over empirical observation. This is not in the realm of critique; it is, in any substantive way. To my eye, it qualifies as rejection.

Point 3: There is a difference between *hierarchy* as a model and structure and *a particular hierarchy* as a historical artifact. I was speaking about the latter, not the former.

Point 4: As I said, my rumination was not systematic research and did not employ a defendable sample population, so it was (as I said) not adequate to characterize the entirety of the “New Right” movement. However, I do know and regularly have to engage with Tea Partiers as a matter of course, and some of the discussions have been heated; just as my knowledge of these tea partiers does not alone imply generalizable knowledge about the movement, neither does the fact that Fantini knows of no such cases (in fact, it is even less indicative). Minimal engagement with the popular “data” (press, campaigns, local elections and policy issues across the nation as we’ve seen them play out over the last four years) doesn’t support a quick conclusion that an anti-Enlightenment ideological thread can be dismissed *a priori*.

With regard to democracy as a form (again, Point 4), there is no doubt that there are forms of democratic thought and practice that predate the Enlightenment. There is also no doubt that there are significant differences between democracy as a modern form in the context of large-scale, highly mediated post-Westphalean societies and its previous instantiations. I don’t think it’s useful to pretend that there aren’t, particularly when the empirical objects at issue (and that probably merit a great deal of research) are situated in the latter.